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 The degree to which an institutional system diverges from the normative order that 
creates it is a measure of the legitimacy of the system as a whole, as it defines the coherence 
between the system’s means and its ends. Like the constitutionalism of other countries, that 
of Cuba tells the story of its particular divergence, the centuries-old tradition summarized 
by the phrase: “The law is respected, but not followed.”1  
The Cuban Revolution, victorious in 1959, displays a persistent feature of the 
political culture of revolutions: “Revolution is made not through law but through politics.” 
The temptation to look for freedom outside of the law reappeared in the form of nihilism 
towards juridical approaches and in the devaluation of the role of law and of legal culture, 
even to the point that the Revolution was thought of as being beyond the law. If material 
guarantees of rights were the essential thing, their formal coverage was superfluous, and 
indeed law as a whole may have been superfluous given the rhythm and scale of the social 
transformations.2 There was no shortage of voices in the desert: “It is a very serious error 
to argue that, for the same reason that law is a form of expression and a politically 
applicable tool, it is right to move away from its normative precepts on account of 
                                                 
1 Transl. note: The original expression, widely used in the Spanish-speaking world to convey the idea of 
paying lip service to the law, is “La ley se acata, pero no se cumple.”  
2 See Hugo Azcuy, «Revolución y derechos», Cuadernos de Nuestra América, Vol. XII No. 23, enero-junio 
1995, pp. 145-155 
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considerations of a political nature” that do not help resolve the problem.3 For the citizenry, 
this fact took the following form: The citizenry could not enjoy the legal abstraction of 
citizenship. Political rights would not be granted to a person according to his or her legal 
status as a citizen, but rather according to his or her political status as a revolutionary. 
The power established in 1976: “The people’s state” 
 With the promulgation of the Socialist Constitution on February 24, 1976 via the 
free, direct, and secret vote of 97.7% of the electorate, the Cuban state organized the 
institutional system that the people had demanded. It advanced toward a socialist legal state 
that facilitated legitimate procedures for the creation of the norms by which the system 
would function, and the state proclaimed its willingness to be subject to those norms.4 
 Passed at the peak of the period in which the Cuban Revolution was rebuilding the 
profile of socialism under the influence of the USSR, as the ideology of a “state of the 
whole people,” or of the “People’s State,” the 1976 text established the following 
principles, among others: A republican, democratic, and unitary form of government, 
organized as a system of people’s power at the national and local level, in provinces and 
municipalities – the latter with very little autonomy; an assembly-based institutional 
design, with a great concentration of legal prerogatives in the highest body of state power 
– a model that was neither presidential nor parliamentarian – integrated with the institutions 
of “real socialism”; the fundamental prominence of the state in society’s political system 
and a centralized system of management; express constitutional recognition of the Cuban 
                                                 
3 Fernando Álvarez Tabío, Comentarios a la Constitución Socialista, Editorial Pueblo y Educación, La 
Habana, 1989, p 56. 
4 See Julio Fernández Bulté, «Tras las pistas de la Revolución en cuarenta años de Derecho», Temas, No. 
16-17, octubre 1998-junio 1999, pp 104-119. 
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Communist Party5 as the driving force in society and in the state; limited constitutional 
enumeration of political and mass organizations; enshrinement of state socialist ownership 
of all property other than property falling into one of the four categories of property 
recognized by the Constitution – that of small agricultural landowners, personal property, 
property of cooperatives, and property of social and mass organizations; principles of unity 
of power and democratic centralism as the functional core of the state apparatus; special 
regulation of political, civil, economic, and cultural rights, and rights relating to the family; 
recognition of international proletarianism and the right of political asylum for those 
fighting colonialism and other forms of exploitation; creation of an institutional system of 
people’s power – including authentic creations that did not exist either in the socialist world 
or in the liberal tradition – coordinated with a system of “authoritative command” (direct 
nomination of candidates by the people, and their subsequent direct election in municipal 
assemblies, an end to delegates and deputies, in favor of a participatory regime at the local 
level with accountability to the voters), as well as collegiality and the “renewability”6 of 
state bodies.   
The constitutional reform of 1992: Reestablishing socialism 
 The fall of the Eastern European socialist bloc propelled Cuba into one of the 
deepest crises of its history. The Cuban institutional model and its normative order 
resembled the smile of the Cheshire Cat. The cat was already gone, but one could still see 
its smile. Without its ideological reference point, and without the material project that 
                                                 
5 Transl. note: In Spanish, PCC or Partido Comunista de Cuba. 
6 Transl. note: In Spanish, renovabilidad. It is not clear what the intended meaning is here even after 
consultation with native Spanish speakers. Quotation marks added. 
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sustained it, a good part of the ideologemes expressed in the 1976 Constitution were left 
hanging in the air. 
The performance of the model of political organization during 1986-1996 period 
raised fundamental questions about its design. The new design – promoted “from above” 
and forced “from below” – positioned “political opening” as the key to governance. 
“Opening” was understood as a willingness to do the following: charting a socialist course 
that different from the reforms adopted in the Eastern Bloc countries, given their 
consequences; distributing the costs of the crisis widely in society; capitalizing on the 
values of social justice and national independence; letting go of the burdensome politics of 
the “official doctrine”; recovering traditions of thought about the nation; advancing the 
distinction between the state – now secular and then some – and the party; reevaluating the 
role of the market in socialism; making progress in avoiding an excessive role for the state 
in the social sphere; finding spaces to resolve problems in ways that were self-directed and 
initiated by individuals, groups, and families; expanding the possibility of less state-
dependent relationships, given their ineffectiveness; taking a national approach on 
reducing the classist nature of the state;7 allowing social thought and the exploration of 
alternatives; facilitating alternatives to the state form of property; promoting citizen 
participation in the debate about the agenda for change; decentralizing certain aspects of 
the management of people’s power; reducing the state defense budget through new forms 
of financing within the military sector. These were some of the key measures that achieved 
                                                 
7 Transl. note: The phrase in Spanish here is “nacionalizar” el Estado sobre su carácter “clasista” 
(quotations marks in original). The meaning remains unclear even after consultation with several native 
Spanish speakers, so a best guess has been offered here on the basis of context. The curious might consult 
with the authors.  
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the essential goal: Stopping the country’s descent and re-launching a project of survival 
and development starting in the second half of the 1990s. 
 The constitutional reform not only stripped the text of florid ideological prose of 
the 1976 version, but also achieved several other things: 1) It modified the property regime 
by permitting foreign investment, resolving the constitutional problem created by a 1983 
law – Decree 50 – which permitted foreign investment despite the lack of constitutional 
authority for it, and which had rarely been applied; it also limited state property to the 
fundamental means of production, and indirectly, by technically permitting private 
property in the constitutional text, made it possible for natural persons to own the means 
of production;8 2) It changed the social base as well as the religious orientation of the state 
by eliminating its classist character and making a commitment “to all people and to the 
good of all people” and by coming out against religious discrimination; 3) It redefined the 
ideological character of the Cuban Communist Party, which shed its status as the 
“organized vanguard of the working class” in favor of a view – in the tradition of Jose 
Martí – of a party of a republican nation in communion with Marxism; 4) It eliminated 
references to the “unity of authority” and to “democratic centralism” as functional 
organizational principles for the state; 5) It required direct elections for the provincial and 
national assemblies; 6) It eschewed recognition of particular social and mass organizations, 
making it possible to create new political groupings; and 7) It abandoned the idea that 
international trade was the exclusively a state prerogative and decentralized the 
management of such trade; it also outlined the “state of emergency” – to this day never 
                                                 
8 Hugo Azcuy, «Cuba: reforma constitucional o nueva Constitución», Cuadernos de Nuestra América, 
Vol.XI, No. 22, julio-diciembre, 1994, p. 51. 
Guanche & Fernández Estrada 
6 
 
declared – regulated by the National Defense Act, which does not specify the 
circumstances in which a state of emergency is to be declared. 
 However, twenty years later, the reform has not led to even a significant portion of 
the possibilities that the law contained. Indeed, the constitutional field is not even seen as 
an issue in Cuba. There is virtually no use of the Constitution among state functionaries 
and the citizenry: There are no systematic or published reflections in intellectual sources 
about the law and the possibilities opened up by the 1992 reform – nor about Cuban 
constitutionalism in general – nor does the subject show up in official discourse. It is highly 
likely that the citizenry is actually unaware of the constitutional text. In a survey carried 
out in 1987 in twelve provinces in the country, which included eleven groups representing 
the population as a whole, it was revealed that two-thirds of those surveyed were unaware 
of the Constitution as the country’s most important law; and that included 44.5% of all 
political leaders.9 The information existing today is not accessible to the public, but the 
public perception is that the situation is as least as serious now as it was then. 
 In the situation since February 24, 2008, with the election of a new president of the 
Council of State and Ministers, Raúl Castro Ruz, strengthening institutions has been 
declared a government priority, along with food production.10 New commissions have been 
created within the National Assembly; decisions have been decentralized to municipal 
governments – for instance municipal agricultural departments; the 6th Congress of the 
Cuban Communist Party has taken place, producing the Guidelines on the Political and 
                                                 
9 Citada en Hugo Azcuy, «Revolución y derechos», Cuadernos de Nuestra América, Vol. XII No. 23, 
enero-junio 1995, pp. 145-155, cita en p. 150. Transl. note: The original Spanish of what is rendered here 
as “political leaders” is dirigentes. It is not clear whether the term refers to a particular class leaders in the 
Cuban political system or to leaders in general. 
10 See Raúl Castro Ruz’ speech of February 24, 2008. 
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Social Economy of the State for the next five years; there have been advances in changing 
regulations that were hindering judicial business, namely sales of homes and vehicles; 
agrarian reform in which cultivated land is turned over to small-scale farmers; 
experimentation with state reforms at the local level in the provinces of Artemisa and 
Mayabeque; an increase in the number of work activities that people may do on their own 
account; approval of a new Tax Law; and the declaration that the Constitution  should be 
reformed when it is “appropriate”11 to do so.  
More power for the people: Completing the constitutional order, starting with the people 
 In 2002, a new constitutional reform, the latest one so far, established the socialist 
system as permanent and irrevocable.12 
 The argument outlined in the new text is that only political practice can produce 
socialist realities, while enshrinement in the constitution helps reproduce them: Law 
without politics is not enough, just as politics without law is not enough. The Constitution 
does not have demiurgic powers. A project of fundamental social transformation occurs in 
the realm of juridical and legal culture, as well as in that of material politics, which, with 
                                                 
11 Transl. note: The Spanish word rendered here as “appropriate” is pertinente. Quotation marks in original. 
12 The actual text of the reform established, via a Special Order, the process that led to the reform: “The 
people of Cuba – almost all – between June 15-18, 2002, expressed their decided support for the project of 
constitutional reform proposed by the mass organizations in an extraordinary assembly of their national 
leaders that took place on the 10th of that same month of June, in which all parts of the Constitution of the 
Republic were ratified and in which it was declared that the Constitution’s socialist character and the 
political and social system it contains are irrevocable, as a dignified and categorical response to the 
demands and threats of the imperialist United State government on May 20, 2002.” The reform modified 
Articles 3, 11, and 137 of the constitutional text. The meaning of the reform is explained in this paragraph 
of the new Article 3: “Socialism and the political and social revolutionary system established in this 
Constitution and proved by years of heroic resistance to the aggressive acts and economic warfare of the 
strongest imperialist power that has ever existed, and having demonstrated its capacity to transform the 
country and create an entirely new and fair society, is irrevocable, and Cuba will never again return to 
capitalism.” (Granma, June 27, 2002)   
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the Constitution as support and institutional guarantor, this change strengthens the exercise 
of the people’s power.  
In this regard, we argue that the main challenge, in a strict legal sense, that the 1976 
Constitution and the 1992 and 2002 reforms have for reproducing socialist realities is a 
challenge that it has had since its beginning: the lack of defensive mechanisms for 
protecting both the institutional system and for achieving more effectively the huge list of 
individual rights that it enshrines. In other words, the challenge is the impossibility, from 
the citizen’s point of view, of achieving what the law requires regardless of the willingness 
of the state to achieve it.  
The absence of these mechanisms can be explained by understanding what the state 
inherited from the 1976 Constitution, “the victorious doctrine of Marxism-Leninism,” as 
its preamble declared. If the state belongs to everyone, citizen action (whether individual 
or collective) against state activity is unnecessary from any point of view. The 
constitutional reforms of 1992 and 2002 maintained the problem created in 1976: the 
system regulated access to power, but not rights before power, nor rights of power, nor the 
control of power. 
The socialist strength of the Cuban state is not guaranteed by the first article of the 
text as reformed in 1992: “Cuba is a socialist workers’ state, independent and sovereign, 
organized with everyone and for the good of everyone, as a unitary and democratic 
republic, for the enjoyment of political liberty, social justice, individual and collective 
wellbeing, and human solidarity.” Nor is it guaranteed by the declaration of principles in 
the 2002 reform. On the other hand, building socialism is not about having the state as the 
only political agent, but rather is about having a multiplicity of actors working for that goal. 
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Here what interests us is merely to point out a vital necessity: the institutional organization 
of the citizens’ regime: their political and legal empowerment to carry out their 
prerogatives effectively. Defending the institutional system and the catalog of rights and 
duties is not only a duty but is also a political right of the citizen: it is political-legal citizen 
action. 
The Constitution is the juridical statute of a political project.13 In addition, if state 
power has the original legitimacy possessed by the Cuban state, to defend the Constitution 
is also to defend the political project of socialism. The exercise of fundamental rights – via 
their constitutional recognition, via the social policies that guarantee them materially, and 
via the system of legal guarantees that make them meaningful where rights are violated or 
not fulfilled – becomes the socialization of authority. 
 
The critique of “socialist constitutionalism” 
The normative nature of law 
 The normative nature of law was the great question at issue in “socialist 
constitutionalism,” indicated by the reduction of law to mere politics under the terms of 
“revolutionary finalism” and “revolutionary legality.” 
 The terms originate from a 1925 controversy. Solts, a high functionary in the 
Communist Party of the USSR, in a dispute with the jurist Krylenko, argued for the primacy 
of revolutionary ends, and as a result, the primacy of politics over law. For Solts, a 
                                                 
13 See Julio Fernández Bulté, «Los desafíos de la justicia constitucional en América Latina en los umbrales 
del siglo XXI», Revista Cubana de Derecho. No11, 1996; Pedro Néstor Sagués, Crisis de la supremacía 
constitucional, Revista de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas, Vol 46, números 1, 2 y 3, 1986, Perú; Martha 
Prieto Valdés, «El Derecho, La Constitución y la interpretación», en Leonardo Pérez Gallardo (comp.), 
Perspectiva del Derecho cubano actual, tomo 1, Editorial Reus, Madrid, 2006. 
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functionary and a judge were authorized not to apply the law after raising the flag of 
“revolutionary finalism.” 
 The issue appears, in another form, in the more sophisticated juridical science that 
the Russian Revolution produced, in the works of Pashukanis (1976) and Stucka (1969), 
which made a great effort to distinguish between law and politics, with the former being a 
voluntary selection of the interests of the ruling class. With that observation, he opened the 
way for Vyshinskij – the greatest promoter of Stalinist Soviet law and the monitor of 
goings-on in Moscow – to establish the preeminence of discretion in the political system 
established by the law. 
 In this context, defending the normativity of law and the protection of legality could 
only be part of a rhetoric that could never come to fruition. The defense of normativity 
tried to open some possibilities. Cerroni (1977) has summarized the arguments that a 
significant number of jurists within the USSR were discussing with regard to defending 
legality, reconsidering the problems of direct democracy, and establishing the normative 
nature of law. 
 The idea expressed by Solts was in conflict with legal positivism, in particular with 
the normativism of Hans Kelsen. However, in the version offered by Soviet Marxism, 
Kelsen is unrecognizable.14  Everything was treated as a problem of practical politics, 
producing as a corollary an understanding of the Constitution more as a program than as a 
norm that restricted the action of public authorities and the citizenry. 
                                                 
14 In Cuba, the works of Pashukanis and Stucka became known only through Soviet commentators, as both 
were victims of Stalinist repression. As happened with them, Kelsen was also criticized without being 
known first-hand. Thus it became impossible to relate his works – A General Theory of the State and Pure 
Theory of Law – to the texts that in this area are essential works – The Communist Theory of Law and the 
State (1957), Socialism and State (1982), and The Idea of Natural Law and Other Essays (1946). The 
global criticisms of Kelsen outside Soviet Marxism – like that of Max Adler (1982) and Hermann Heller 
(1998) are unknown in Cuba.  
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 This point took the form of reducing rights protection to the existence of the 
material conditions that made the exercise of rights possible. The very nature of the right 
was called into question in this way, as its exercise was dependent on the ability of the state 
to satisfy it; the right was not assured as a right per se. 
 Along the same lines, “socialist constitutionalism” copied precisely what Kelsen 
had rejected. In both, if the right cannot be vindicated then it is not a right: there are no 
rights without guarantees. The influence of legal positivism in the intellectual culture of 
Soviet Marxism would be enormously persistent. 
 There are also other ways to understand the problem: the right exists, independent 
of any guarantee, and the state remains obligated, as a result of its normative recognition 
of the right, to establish policies oriented in that direction; to seek social consensus on the 
steps towards satisfaction of the right; and to create guarantees for the fulfillment of the 
right. 
 Defending the normative nature of the Constitution is not the same as a “legalistic” 
understanding that “only” prioritizes the norm over the revolutionary purpose. Rather, this 
defense provides a concrete way to relate the two to each other: translating revolutionary 
purposes into fundamental rights. The state’s purpose might be seen as to fulfill 
“revolutionary ends” in the following sense: cataloguing the fundamental rights that it 
establishes (Ferrajoli 1999). 
 From this perspective, a functionary or judge would not interpret the “revolutionary 
ends” according to their particular expression in current political discourse; rather he or 
she would vindicate fundamental rights that have been normatively established through 
political deliberation mediated by law, with the result that if the law contradicts 
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fundamental rights – that is, contradicts revolutionary ends – the judge or functionary could 
find revolutionarily that the law does not apply, against whatever legal positivism might 
say in any of its forms – Kelsen or “socialist constitutionalism.” 
 Today arguments that draw on other bases in the philosophy of law are being 
renewed that reassert the role of the state in protecting rights, or that see the state as a 
precondition for the existence of the rights themselves. Thus Juan González Bertomeu, in 
the prologue to the Spanish edition of Stephen Holmes’ and Cass Sunstein’s book The Cost 
of Rights,15 highlights the central thesis of the work and explains the view in which the 
realization of rights – whether civil, political, social, or cultural – depend on the state and 
on the degree to which the state’s budget provides for their protection. According to this 
view, the state must be strong rather than weak in its principal role as protector and 
guarantor of human rights. From a legal-philosophical point of view this is like saying that 
without the state there are no rights, because it would be impossible to understand rights 
without the existence of the entity that protects them materially. 
 This argument helps refute the idea that in a state of nature rights would be at 
constant risk of violation, because it reveals that prior to the social compact there is no 
state, and therefore no rights. 
 However, the foregoing does not mean that all we should be concerned about is 
knowing the real cost of rights to know practically when and how the state will make them 
real; instead it illuminates for us the idea that without state backing rights would be merely 
voices in the air, that without guarantees rights are merely legal formulas; but that the moral 
                                                 
15 We refer here to the statement of Juan F González Bertomeu, in the prologue to the Spanish edition of 
Stephen Holmes’ and Cass Sunstein’s El Costo de los Derechos (The Cost of Rights), Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores, Buenos Aires, 2011. 
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and civil weight provided by simple constitutional recognition of a right should not be 
underestimated; and that rights must be defended from both philosophical perspectives – 
from the most positivist which makes them depend on the state legal norms that define 
them, to the most natural-law position which enables us to sensitize the political sphere to 
the vindication of human rights, that is, that there are rights built from people’s 
accumulated struggles that need not wait for a state to say whether a given right exists or 
not. 
 The 1976 Cuban Constitution has always been considered more of a program than 
a normative text of immediate applicability. In fact the Constitution is only rarely invoked 
in the country’s courts (Prieto 2008), even though there is no legal principal to prevent it 
from being invoked. 
 In recent years some have argued for the possibility of its direct application. Martha 
Prieto has made the strongest case for the Constitution as a norm or program: “Its 
effectiveness may diminish as its principles, values, and premises cannot be implemented, 
and in that case a legislator who does not follow constitutional commands fails to apply 
the Constitution, or as I prefer to say, he commits ‘unconstitutionality by omission’” (Prieto 
1997). 
 Thus it is possible to defend the necessity for direct application of the Constitution 
as a daily practice for people, state actors, and courts, as it is from that application that 
rights and duties directly flow – comparing the use of every norm with the letter and the 
spirit of the Constitution such that the Constitution prevails in all circumstances. 
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 Citizenry, socialist state, and citizens’ rights  
 “Socialist constitutionalism” interprets the issue of citizenship and its attendant 
rights in a peculiar way. It purports to challenge the concept of citizenship, without 
providing an alternative to the concept other than that of the “proletariat,” when the 
emancipation of the proletariat necessarily leads to the emancipation of the rest of society. 
In fact, there does not seem to be any term in Marxist-Leninist socialism that plays the role 
played by the citizen in the storyline of democratic thought. 
 The rights of citizens are the key to the democratic relationship between citizen and 
state. “Socialist constitutionalism” took this issue in a different direction: the supposed 
existence of “bourgeois rights.”16 
                                                 
16 Azcuy offers an example: “The most important constitutional documents in the modern era, rooted in the 
theories built up since their beginnings, are the product of the great bourgeois revolutions of the 17 th and 
18th centuries: The Bill of Rights in the English Revolution of 1689; the declarations of rights and of 
independence in the American Revolution in 1776; and the 1789 and 1793 Declarations of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen in France. Of course, all have points in common that express the same values and 
the same needs” (p. 37).  
 
The words contained in these documents may be pure bourgeois lies. However, it is necessary to 
distinguish among them. The Constitution of 1793 marked the historic establishment of democracy as the 
program of the working classes. That text expresses the triumph of the radical Jacobin wing of the French 
Revolution, in that it achieves extraordinary victories over the political economy of capital and over state 
organization of civil life; it establishes the right to subsistence as a fundamental right, enshrining it in the 
concept of popular political economy; and it destroys the “civil” distinction between passive and active 
citizens. 
 
The text establishes universal, direct suffrage based on popular sovereignty; it opposes the separation of 
powers and introduces for the first time in constitutionalism the right to aid, to work, and to education; it 
prohibits slavery and establishes the right to rebellion as flowing from all the other rights. It also establishes 
what Robespierre had argued for since 1790 in the concept of fraternity: being reciprocally free and equal, 
that is, universalizing equality and freedom from the inequality (both social and civil) of the ancient 
regime; or in other words, overcoming the subjection, as passive citizens, of farmers, day laborers, serfs, 
small-scale artisans, apprentices, and all those who “made their living with their hands” (Doménech 2004). 
The defeat of this revolutionary current in 1795 established opposite principles: division of authority, 
census suffrage, and representation based on national sovereignty. 
 
The 1776 North American [Transl.: meaning future U.S.A.] text is not comparable with that of 1793: the 
“founding fathers” repudiated democracy; it was unthinkable to them that slaves might join political life as 
equals, and as a result they established an ideal of liberty based on the economic independence of small 
landholders.      
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 The problem with “bourgeois revolutions” that produce “bourgeois rights” is their 
logical result: these rights are false and therefore useless. However, Marx never used the 
term “bourgeois democracy” and the bourgeoisie never carried out a democratic revolution, 
neither in 1789 nor in 1848 (Doménech 2009) (González Casanova 1987). All of Marx’s 
doctrine, both that of the “young” Marx and that of the Marx of Das Kapital, draws on and 
elaborates an “anti-bourgeois” heritage: the republican fraternal legacy of the 
revolutionaries of 1793 and 1848. 
 There is no such thing as “bourgeois rights,” but instead a bourgeois understanding 
of rights. Understanding the situation in this way makes it possible to challenge the 
particular doctrinal use of rights and not the rights themselves, born as they were from a 
long process of social struggles that effectively tore them from the ruling classes. 
 “Socialist constitutionalism” created very precisely what Siéyes has written: the 
Third Estate is the nation (Siéyes 1989, 91). Siéyes described the Third Estate as a broad 
concept that includes the social whole, when in reality it merely covered the bourgeoisie 
and completely excluded the “Fourth Estate”: servants, wage-laborers, small-scale artisans, 
peasants, and women – all those who, as Marx would note, had to ask the permission of 
others merely to be able to subsist. 
 Grouping all those members of the “Fourth Estate” with the bourgeoisie, and 
indiscriminately calling all the thinkers of the various Estates “bourgeois,” achieves 
different purposes, none of which serves a new socialist constitutionalism, as doing so has 
the consequence of giving precedence to social rights over individual rights, material 
guarantees over legal guarantees, material liberties over formal liberties, and the 
overvaluation of “material” democracy over so-called “formal” democracy. 
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 “Precedence” does not mean the denial of rights established afterwards, but it does 
mean giving some rights priority over others, which leads to a doctrinal predisposition and 
a specific institutional organization for the exercise of one or another type of right, with 
the establishment of corresponding guarantees to this priority. 
 The idea of the “precedence” of one type of rights over others – political rights over 
social rights, or vice versa – was characteristic of the political use of the issue of human 
rights among Cold War powers. The idea was fixed in United Nations agreements on 
human rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is binding on the 
parties, while the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights is 
hortatory, as it understands political and civil rights as more important than economic and 
social rights – “more costly” and “less vital” (Gordon 2009). 
 The consequences for the citizenry of the precedence of social rights over 
individual rights are well-known: It builds a welfare-based pattern of participation and 
creates a passive citizenry waiting for the public provision of good and services. However, 
the key feature of a democratic system is not revealed in what the system grants, but rather 
in what the system forms, not in what is provided in the form of goods and social services 
by the state, but in the quality of the citizen – quality that can be put into practice in this 
political design. 
 Nevertheless, today ideas are proposed – with strong theoretical and ethical support 
– in favor of the protection and differentiated defense of rights, but for another reason and 
in a different way: 
 Sueli Carneiro puts forward a different but revealing argument in favor of granting 
special consideration t the regulation and protection of human rights: It is understood that 
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rights can be and must be protected in a differentiated way without violating the principal 
of formal equality, that is, the social and personal starting point for the enjoyment of rights 
must be the state’s defense of those rights through granting special benefits that favor the 
realization of those rights, benefits without which it would be impossible for groups of 
people, social classes, and individuals to have fair access to rights that are considered 
universal and inalienable.17 
 The new Latin American constitution has established normatively the principle that 
represents a Copernican revolution with respect to the “prevalence” of one kind of rights 
or another: “progressivity,” which assumes both the quantitative growth of rights and the 
qualitative growth of the relationships among them, via principles of irrevocability, 
indivisibility, and interdependence (1999, Article 19). This contemplates a kind of 
relationship of citizen and state, the study of which it may be useful to compare to the 
Cuban practice in this area, which we do in the following section. Here we are not talking 
about copying institutions created for different contexts, but we do mean to build greater 
dialogue than what exists now with respect to the experiences of democratic transformation 
of oligarchical power that has been so dominant in the history of the region, which, as in 
Cuba, have occurred in the midst of domestic and foreign attacks on those processes. 
Starting this dialogue today will bear dividends for the future law of Latin American 
integration.   
Toward a new socialist constitutionalism: proposals for Cuba 
Rights and Guarantees 
                                                 
17 Carneiro Sueli, Human Rights and the Fight Against Inequality: Discrimination and Violence, in Revista 
Casa de las Américas, number 264, July-September 2011, pp. 121-134. 
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 In the Cuban Constitution, among the rights not termed “human rights,” there are 
no distinctions drawn between, on the one hand, economic, cultural, and social rights and 
on the other hand, civil and political rights. The text does not use the widely discussed 
classification that has been present in human rights doctrine since the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. But nor does the text indicate that all the rights mentioned 
are of equal status or force. 
 The text provides a specific chapter on fundamental rights that captures all the 
rights established in the 1948 Universal Declaration, with the exception of three: the right 
to life, the right to recognition of legal personhood, and the right to freedom of movement 
and emigration – all of which are regulated by specific laws (the Penal Code, the Civil 
Code, and Migration Law 1312 of 1976) as well as by decisions of the state’s central 
administrative bodies. In addition, the text establishes a group of principles that must be 
considered rights: equality, participation, and the right to petition the state. Several rights 
can be identified in the constitutional text that correspond to the so-called “third-
generation” rights, like the right to a clean environment, the right to participate in sports, 
the right to a comfortable home, and the right to national defense, among others (Torrado 
2003). Civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights established in the various UN 
covenants require updating in the Cuban constitutional order, but are for the most part 
recognized (Delgado Sánchez 2009); in fact, in the case of social, economic, and cultural 
rights, all are recognized. 
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 The Cuban constitutional declaration of rights was not behind the times in 1976, 
but it is in 2010, if it is compared not only with the aforementioned covenants but also with 
the rights introduced by the new Latin American constitutionalism.18 
 As Professor Martha Prieto puts it: 
In 1976 socioeconomic and cultural rights were included as fundamental 
rights, and thus material guarantees necessary to assure these rights were 
also constitutionalized. Thus the only provider of the resources needed to 
assure these rights would be the state, and a judgment was made to prioritize 
material guarantees over guarantees considered legal or formal. 
The constitutional establishment of rights in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia 
 Among the principles recognized in Venezuela are: special protection for 
vulnerable groups and persons; equality in status among all citizens;19 the normative 
recognition of rights established by the Constitution even where regulatory law developing 
those rights is lacking; recognition of human rights treaties, covenants, and conventions as 
part of the constitutional order and as directly applicable within the country; a guarantee of 
a constitutional rights proceeding in defense of liberty and security that is oral, public, 
brief, and available to any person without any hindering formalities. 
                                                 
18 All of the principles and rights mentioned in what follows are discussed with respect to their presentation 
in the constitutional text, not with respect to their application in practical politics, an issue that would have 
to be the subject of another inquiry. Comparing the Constitution and Cuban practice solely with these 
constitutions is not the best way of carrying out a comparison, which would require comparing the same 
items, but the point of looking to the constitutional field is not so much to compare as it is to look for ways 
to update the Cuban constitutional practice.  
19 Transl. note: The principle of equality among citizens is conveyed through a constitutional provision 
barring titles of nobility or other signifiers of inequality, with an exception for diplomats. The authors of 
this paper refer to this provision with the following phrase: el trato oficial y obligatorio de ciudadano o 
ciudadana. This might be rendered as something like “the official and compulsory treatment of persons as 
citizens,” but this literal translation does not capture the concept of equality conveyed by the constitutional 
provision that it refers to. 
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 The concept of buen vivir20 in Ecuador and Bolivia provides for the following with 
respect to rights: access to information technology and to the frequencies of the radio 
spectrum for the management of radio and television stations; the right to seek, receive, 
exchange, and produce truthful information; the right to artistic freedom; access to public 
space as a place of deliberation; reduced rates for the elderly on public and private 
transportation and for tickets to shows; conscientious objection to military service or other 
activities; the right of same-sex couples to marry (only in Ecuador); and the right to 
emigrate and return voluntarily. There is similar special protection for the rights of people 
with disabilities, people with serious illnesses, the incarcerated, users and consumers of 
drugs; and the same rights are granted to families formed by marriage and those formed by 
monogamous unions. Food sovereignty is also enshrined as a right and local food 
production is prioritized. Chemical weapons are prohibited; the use of transgenic 
organisms is subject to the law; and for the first time in history nature is declared a subject 
of rights. 
 At the time of its promulgation, the Cuban Constitution did not take into account 
well-established institutions for defending rights, like the Mexican amparo21 or the 
defensoría del pueblo.22 In fact, in the Cuban scheme there is a mismatch between the 
                                                 
20 Transl. note: The phrase “buen vivir” has been translated in other academic work as meaning something 
like “the right to a good life.” The concept evidently draws on indigenous traditions in the region and is 
akin to the idea of “gross national happiness” adopted in Bhutan; in this document the phrase is left in 
Spanish to indicate that its meaning is probably not fully captured by a literal translation. For an overview 
of the concept, see Thomas Fathauer, Buen Vivir: Latin America’s New Concepts for the Good Life and 
the Rights of Nature, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2011, available at: 
http://www.boell.de/publications/publications-buen-vivir-12636.html 
21 Transl. note: The amparo is a constitutional lawsuit. The word is left in the original Spanish to indicate 
that a literal translation as “constitutional lawsuit” does not adequately indicate that the amparo is a special 
cause of action specifically created to enable constitutional challenges. 
22 Transl. note: The defensoría del pueblo is typically an independent government office charged with 
investigating and prosecuting human rights abuses. The phrase is often rendered as “ombudsman” and the 
authors of this text later use the two terms as apparent synonyms.  
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declaration of rights and the corresponding guarantees, as the latter are generic, abstract, 
and poorly developed, especially with respect to the so-called judicial safeguards.23       
 The weakness of the mechanisms for the protection of rights under the Cuban 
Constitution can be explained by the fact that material guarantees are given ideological 
precedence over juridical guarantees, which is justified by the social project of the Cuban 
Revolution – a project that has achieved the UN Millennium Development Goals. 
However, the completion of the system of rights protection is essential if there is to be a 
progressive framework for strengthening Cuban institutions – including not only the state 
but the institutional foundation for citizens’ rights. 
 The judicial safeguards established by the Cuban Constitution are, among others, 
due process, limits on confiscation, the non-retroactivity of new laws, the application of 
criminal law in a way that most advantages the defendant, and the general guarantee that 
appears in Article 62, which states the following: 
None of the freedoms accorded to citizens may be exercised against what is 
established in the Constitution and the laws, nor against the existence and 
ends of the socialist state, nor against the Cuban people’s decision to build 
socialism and communism. The violation is of this principle is punishable.  
 
 Article 63 establishes the right to lodge complaints and make petitions to 
the authorities, without any further specification or corresponding procedural 
means for exercising this right. 
 The Cuban legal system has special norms that compensate in part for what is 
missing in the Constitution. The Criminal Procedure Act provides for habeas corpus as a 
guarantee of the right of liberty. The Civil, Administrative, and Labor Procedure Act 
                                                 
23 Transl. note: In Spanish, garantías jurisdiccionales, which is rendered variously in other works as 
“judicial safeguards,” “due process,” or less elegantly as “jurisdictional guarantees.”  
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guarantees economic and family rights via ordinary and special proceedings and governs 
the protection of possession of property as well as administrative and labor procedures. 
The Penal Code establishes sanctions against forms of discrimination or [the violation of]24 
constitutional rights. The Attorney General’s Office25 has the constitutional mandate to 
ensure legality and is charged with providing legal protection for the people’s right to 
petition officials. Nowadays there seems to be consensus that the above-mentioned 
procedures must be updated and completed (de la Cruz y Cobo 2009)(de la Cruz, 
Hernández, y otros 2010)(Aguado, y otros 2009)(Delgado Sánchez 2009). 
In another area – the specific area of rights guarantees in labor relations, in Cuba 
we find various special regimes for labor and workplace discipline, indicating that there 
are conflicts in these areas that are not resolved by courts. An example of this is the System 
of Customs Bodies,26 the Basic Units of Cooperative Production,27 the leadership of social 
and mass organizations, and the civil servants of the Interior Ministry and the Armed 
Forces.28 
The system of human rights guarantees in the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia 
 The system of rights guarantees in Ecuador is highly developed, consisting of the 
following remedies: a constitutional protection proceeding; an action against harmful 
                                                 
24 This phrase seems to be missing given the context. 
25 Transl. note: The name of this institution in Spanish is Fiscalía General de la Republica. As is detailed 
below, it has functions that make it similar to the defensoría of other countries in the region.  
26 Transl. note: In Spanish, Sistema de Órganos Aduaneros.  
27 Transl. note: In Spanish, Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa. 
28 This refers to an idea of Cutié Mustelier, Danelia y Méndez López, Josefina: Derechos y Garantías 
judiciales en Cuba. Notas para una propuesta procesal, en Escritos sobre Derecho Procesal Constitucional, 
coordinado por Matilla Correa y Ferrer Mc- Gregor, editado por Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la 
UNAM, Instituto Mexicano de Derecho Procesal, UNAM, Unijuris y Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad 
de la Habana, La Habana, pág. 357 y 358. 
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public or private policies; habeas corpus action to counter illegal deprivations of liberty 
and to protect life and physical integrity; an action for access to public information; a 
habeas data for discovering the existence of documents, genetic information and files 
containing personal information; an action to address non-compliance in the application of 
regulations, decisions, or reports of international human rights organizations; and the 
extraordinary action against decisions or edicts where a constitutional right has been 
violated. 
 Bolivia follows the standard of full establishment of rights and guarantees begun in 
the Venezuelan constitution. All of the rights recognized in Venezuela are directly 
applicable to Bolivia. Penalties of infamy,29 civil death,30 and confinement31 are prohibited; 
legal remedies for the defense of rights have broad and simple coverage and are called by 
their names in Spanish, not Latin. In this way the following are provided for: the action for 
liberty (habeas corpus), the constitutional “amparo” action,32 the action for privacy 
protection; the action against unconstitutionality;33 the “compliance suit”34; and the 
“people’s action” for defense of collective rights.35 Almost all of these actions may be 
brought by the simple means of an amparo. Among other the other valuable rights in the 
employment realm, the Bolivian constitution establishes that workers may, in defense of 
                                                 
29 Transl. note: The Spanish term here, infamia, seems to refer to the sanction, via trial, statute, or some 
other state action, whose effect is to deprive a person of his or her reputation or good name. 
30 Transl. note: The Spanish term here, muerte civil, seems to refer to the complete and permanent loss of 
all civil rights, perhaps analogous to a bill of attainder. 
31 Transl. note: The Spanish term confinamiento refers to a sort of domestic exile, for instance to another 
region of one’s own country.  
32 Transl. note: In Spanish, acción de amparo constitucional. 
33 Transl. note: In Spanish, acción de inconstitucionalidad. 
34 Transl. note: In Spanish, acción de cumplimiento.  
35 Transl. note: In Spanish, acción popular para defender derechos colectivos. 
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their employment, reactivate businesses that are failing or are closed or abandoned for 
unjustified reasons and may thereby form communal or social enterprises.  
The people’s court 
 In pursuit of institutional defense of rights, the new Latin American 
constitutionalism has established the defensoría del pueblo, an authority that is the heir of 
the indirect negative power held by the Plebeian Tribune in the Roman Republic, which 
“could do nothing but could stop anything.” 
 The defensoría del pueblo entered Latin American constitutions from the Spanish 
constitution of 1978, which in turn had borrowed from the Swedish institution of the 
ombudsman. The defensoría in the new Latin American constitutionalism sets a firm 
foundation for overcoming the classic shortcomings of its past.  
 The efficacy of the defensoría is assured by the combination of its institutional 
independence and the development of forms of people power that reassert negative direct 
power.36 
 Venezuela’s defensoría is charged with promoting, defending, and guarding the 
rights and guarantees established in that country’s constitution. It enjoys immunity and is 
guided by principles of gratuity, accessibility, speed, informality, and autonomy.37  The 
institution has the authority to initiate legislation, and the ability to bring actions of 
unconstitutionality, amparo, habeas corpus, habeas data, etc. 
                                                 
36 The direct forms of negative power consist of the right to resist and the right to strike for political 
reasons, to name two. The indirect forms of negative power are related to the capacity of institutions that 
protect popular sovereignty to oppose and veto, capacities that had their historical origin in the Plebeian 
Tribune in the Roman Republic, and which today can and must have other forms of expression. 
37 Transl. note: The Spanish here for the last item in this list is impulso de oficio, which in the context 
seems to mean that the institution has the authority to act autonomously to ensure the protection of rights. 
Guanche & Fernández Estrada 
25 
 
 Ecuador’s defensoría seems to be the most advanced. It can sponsor any of the 
above-mentioned actions, issue enforcement orders related to human rights protection, 
request sanctions for non-compliance with these orders, investigate and address acts and 
omissions related to human rights, and safeguard and promote due process; it can also 
intervene immediately to prevent torture and treatment that is cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading. 
 In Bolivia the defensoría does not take instructions from the state and is instead 
directed by the Multi-Ethnic Legislative Assembly.38 Its characteristics are the same as 
those of the Ecuadorian defensoría. 
 In Cuba the functions of the defensoría are taken on by the Attorney General’s 
Office, a role that descends from the equivalent office39 in the Soviet Union: it represents 
the public interest in legal processes and monitors legality and violations of citizens’ rights.  
 At the time of its creation the pronouncements of Cuba’s Attorney General’s Office 
were not binding. The Attorney General Law40 (Number 83, 1997) addressed this 
shortcoming and enabled it “to act against infringements of constitutional rights and legally 
established guarantees and against breaches of legality in the acts and decisions of state 
institutions and their sub-branches, authorities under the control of local bodies, and other 
economic and social entities, so as to ensure their reestablishment” (Art. 8b), and at the 
same time empowered it to reestablish legality via a decision of the attorney involved. In 
addition to the practical problems of making real these declarations, the regulation leaves 
                                                 
38 Transl. note: The name in Spanish for Bolivia’s national-level legislature is Asamblea Legislativa 
Plurinacional. It is translated into English in various ways to convey that the name is intended to recognize 
the many ethnicities, or nations, within the country of Bolivia. The body was formerly known as the 
Congreso Nacional, or National Congress. 
39 Transl. note: This Soviet office is described here by the Spanish word Procuraduría, which translates 
roughly as “state prosecutor’s office.” 
40 Transl. note: The name in Spanish of this law is Ley de la Fiscalía General de la República. 
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two problems unresolved: the limitations on access to procedural justice and the non-
existence of a mechanism for an immediate remedy in cases where citizens’ rights have 
been violated. 
 The creation and development of the defensoría in Latin America has encountered 
various problems in the past: the great conflict between its geographic spread, its structural 
development, and its growing scope of responsibility; and the tension between the 
expectation it creates and the limitations that existing politics actually imposes on the full 
development of its legal character with respect to its preventive or prohibitive power vis-
à-vis state political action.  
 The defensoría has been called a “court of persuasion”41 because it lacks the 
capacity to sanction or bind. In the opinion of Lobrano, there is a chance that if the 
institution maintains its traditional role it may collapse, because: 
the greater the expectations that the institution creates among the citizenry, 
the greater the risk of disappointment and loss of confidence if appropriate 
legal tools are not supplied to provide satisfaction of these expectations 
(Lobrano 2002, 258). 
 
 However, the institution also has some general advantages over attempts to defend 
rights in courts: 
With regard to discretion in public administration, the ombudsman can go 
beyond what a court may do in assessing a government and its practices. In 
addition, it may initiate proceedings ex oficio…In addition, bringing a claim 
is free, unlike in courts, where the parties have to pay court fees. 
Furthermore, to bring a claim to the ombudsman there is no need to have a 
lawyer as one’s legal representative, which means less expense. Nor are 
there formalities in ombudsman proceedings, in contrast to a case brought 
to a court. In all cases the ombudsman is more accessible than courts, and 
in the human rights context, accessibility is crucially important (Berg 2009). 
 
                                                 
41 Transl. note: The phrase in Spanish is “magistratura de la persuasion.” 
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There is no doctrinal or legal barrier in Cuba that would prevent the establishment of an 
institutional mechanism for expanding the protection of citizens’ rights and interests. What 
is necessary is to begin a civic debate in the country on rights and mechanisms for citizens 
to defend them.  
 If Cuba were to establish it, the new legal institution would have to be governed by 
principles of collegiality, term limits and the potential for the people to recall its 
members,42 revocability by the people, and binding authority in its decisions. It must have 
functional independence and must be structured in line with the country’s territorial 
organization. The evils of bureaucratization and corruption in the defensoría (within the 
liberal separation of powers framework) would be prevented via proceedings which would 
be accelerated but legitimate and sufficient to maintain juridical security and legality, and 
which would be subject to social control. The organization of the institution must be done 
in a particular way and should be done via an organic law in line with constitutional 
principles. 
 Given that the judicial power has its origin in the Roman Republic, it is useful to 
return to this source and to look for its descendants today, in the interest of strengthening 
the defensoría. We suggest translating this heritage in the following ways: 
• The right to legal assistance: This protection that the plebe has against the imperium 
of the high Roman public officials has today simply become the defense of rights 
against the state; even so it is the legal activity that remains most preserved. It could 
be argued that it has the same importance in Cuba as it did in the Roman Republic. 
                                                 
42 Transl. note: This seems to be the meaning of the Spanish terms here, which are temporalidad and 
revocabilidad popular. 
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It might also be useful to provide for the possibility that a government official be 
able to invoke the law against another official who has overstepped his authority. 
• The veto power: The tribunes had veto power over the actions of state bodies when 
it was in the interest of the people to use it. With the defensoría, this power became 
the ability to bring weak (and easily circumvented) challenges to decisions that 
were harmful to citizens’ rights. The veto that we propose would have a 
“suspensive”43 effect; an official could use it to intervene against decisions of any 
other public official. The veto would be like the veto that officials have in a collegial 
body. The veto proposed here for Cuba would have to be extended, like the Roman 
veto, to cover even proposed laws, military mobilization, and elections.   
• The right to call for a plebiscite: The right to call for a plebiscite has been widely 
promoted today by those would hope to reestablish the people’s defenders. A 
people’s official expressing negative indirect power must have the ability to call for 
a plebiscite. 
• The legislative initiative: The problem of constitutional disruption created by 
popular legislative initiative would be resolved by the group of people’s officials, 
with broad legislative initiative. 
• Protection of officials: The Roman intercessio was linked to its ability to personally 
execute its own decisions. The tribunes could fine or have arrested those who 
interfered with their activities. The inviolable nature of the Roman Republic’s 
officials should be adopted as a principle for the protection of officials. It is also 
                                                 
43 Transl. note: In Spanish, suspensivo. There does not appear to be an English equivalent of this word. 
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necessary that the officials’ decisions be binding, and as such this coercion should 
be achieved through a judicial proceeding or via direct enforcement by officials. 
Constitutional control 
 It is essential that there be social involvement in the implementation of the Cuban 
Constitution through citizen-friendly institutional tools that involve all actors in 
constitutional standard-setting.44 
The structures of the classic constitutions provided only for a reform clause as a 
means of constitutional defense, but in later constitutional theory and practice allowance 
was made for exceptional situations, including so-called states of emergency, curfew 
situations, situations of “alarm,”45 conceived of as a political-juridical mechanism for 
preserving the Constitution in times of danger caused by some external or internal situation. 
The state of emergency was included in Cuba following the constitutional reform 
in 1992 and is especially provided for in the National Defense Act (Law 75),46 which does 
not comprehensively cover the treatment of fundamental rights in these circumstances. 
In addition to the reform clause and the regulation of exceptional situations, since 
the early 20th century in practice and later in theory we have also had models of 
                                                 
44 Nelson P. Valdés has analyzed the diversity of new actors as a key part of democratic expansion of the 
Cuban political system: Ín general, the Cuban state reduces its personnel, reduces state bodies (to fewer 
ministries), limits and redefines its functions, decentralizes its powers horizontally and vertically, increases 
the autonomy of the different elements and different levels, promotes new people, permits the appearance 
of new institutional actors and in its functioning adopts measures that promote giving greater space to the 
external market (Valdés 1997, 103). If we agree with Valdés here, our emphasis is on the need for an 
atmosphere of constitutional legality that orders its functioning. 
45 Transl. note: The text refers to situations de alarma. The legal meaning is not clear but it seems to 
suggest something like a state of emergency. 
46 Transl. note: In Spanish, Ley de Defensa Nacional, no. 75. 
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constitutional review.47 The new Latin American constitutionalism has experienced 
important developments in this area. 
In Ecuador constitutional norms in this area are interpreted in the way that best fits 
their overall consideration: in uncertain cases they are interpreted in the most rights-
favorable rights (Article 427). Any judge can send a cause of action to the Constitutional 
Court when he or she perceives a violation of the Constitution. The Court has the authority 
over constitutional interpretation and administration of justice in this area. It can find 
unconstitutionality without the parties’ request, concerning rules related to the case at hand; 
rule on public actions on the basis of substantive or procedural unconstitutionality, rule on 
administrative actions at parties’ request, issue binding final judgments that create 
precedents concerning the aforementioned actions, as well as all of the powers that 
Venezuela’s constitutional court has. 
Constitutional review in the Venezuelan Constitution is in the hands of the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court,48 the highest and final interpreter of the 
Constitution. The body can annul state constitutions as well as executive-branch acts with 
                                                 
47 “The majority of authors refer to two systems of constitutional control: the one known as “diffuse” or as 
the system of “judicial review,” and the one known as “concentrated” or as Austrian-Kelsenian. Other 
authors refer to these and also add the “mixed” and “multiple” systems. Infiesta describes a classification of 
systems of judicial control and political control.” (Fernández Bulté 1994, 16). The model of diffuse review 
originated in the United States’ legal system, beginning with an opinion by Justice Marshall in 1803 that 
became the precedent for making the Supreme Court the highest authority of constitutional interpretation 
and put in its hands the ability to determine unconstitutionality. Such determinations would then spread in a 
diffuse way throughout the justice system, case by case, as courts confronted different questions. 
Concentrated review was established in the Austrian Constitution of 1920, which created a court dedicated 
exclusively to constitutional questions. In some cases we have seen mixtures of the two models, with 
special bodies (almost always part of the highest court itself) dedicated to hearing and resolving suits of 
unconstitutionality. The models have spread in Latin America, where both diffuse review and concentrated 
review have been used, taking the form of the Mexican amparo, which joins constitutional review with 
human rights defense. According to the Mexican professor Fix Zamudio, the Mexican amparo has evolved 
as “a tool for defending the rights of liberty, constitutional control of law, annulment proceedings, and the 
defense of individuals against a given administration” (in Colomer 1990, 108).   
48 Transl. note: In Spanish, the Sala Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo. 
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law-like status; it also reviews whether international treaties conform to the Constitution 
and it can review on its own initiative the constitutionality of presidential declarations of a 
state of emergency. It can declare unconstitutional not only the acts but also the omissions 
of municipal, state, or federal legislatures; can resolve conflicts of laws, settle disputes 
between state institutions, and review final judgments of lower courts in amparo cases and 
in constitutional review cases.  
In Bolivia, the Multi-Ethnic Constitutional Court49 is in charge of constitutional 
review. Its members are chosen taking ethnicity into account, and the court’s characteristics 
are the same as those already presented in the discussion of Ecuador. 
The Cuban Constitution cannot be easily located in the typology fundamental laws 
that classifies according to the model of constitutional control. In the words of Martha 
Prieto and Lissette Pérez, in Cuba 
Protecting the Constitution of the Republic is the responsibility of the 
National Assembly of the People’s Power, which is the highest 
representative body of the state, and as such has the authority to determine 
the constitutionality of laws, law-decrees, and other general decisions. The 
safeguarding of the Constitution is in the hands of the only body with the 
authority to create a constitution and make law, that is, the body that 
represents popular sovereignty. The doctrinal justification for this is that 
there is no one who can better defend the Constitution than the people 
themselves, or failing that, their representatives. Seen in this way, review is 
political and is concentrated ex post (Prieto and Pérez, undated). 
 
 There is review only of the constitutionality of laws – those passed by the National 
Assembly of People’s Power. The Constitution also provides for a kind of internal control 
                                                 
49 Transl. note: In Spanish, the Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional. As noted earlier with respect to 
Bolivia’s national legislative body, the term plurinacional apparently indicates the state’s recognition that 
Bolivia is made up of many ethnicities, or nations. 
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– the so-called “regularity checks”50 – that each state body carries out over each of the 
other state bodies under its supervision. Thus the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, 
the Provincial and Municipal Assemblies of People’s Power, and the people’s courts carry 
out this function in their work of applying law. The responsibility of the Attorney General’s 
Office to promote legality encompasses the protection of the Constitution, although in 
practice its focus is on protecting citizens’ rights. 
In practice there is no review mechanism that promotes the principle of 
constitutional supremacy over all regulations and administrative actions, as there is no legal 
process providing a way for the people to invoke their control authority. The inability the 
sovereign – the people – to intervene in constitutional review is in conflict with the 
constitutional principles of people’s power and socialist democracy. 
As a result, it is essential that a system of constitutional review be established in 
Cuba. The Constitution we have today provides various ways of accomplishing this: via 
the Legal Affairs Committee51 in the National Assembly of People’s Power, where 
constitutional review occurs but without procedural development; or through the creation 
of a chamber within in the Supreme People’s Court52 that would deal with constitutional 
questions, either through lawsuits coming up through ordinary jurisdictional channels or 
through the introduction of the amparo and creation of a constitutional court. 
                                                 
50 Transl. note: In Spanish, control de regularidad. The phrase in general is used to refer to physical or 
institutional “check points.” It is sometimes translated as “judicial review,” although that term is probably 
inappropriate here as review evidently takes place within the legislative body itself. 
  
51 Transl. note: In Spanish, the Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos. 
52 Transl. note: In Spanish, the Tribunal Supremo Popular. 
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A Final Statement 
The immediate future of the political and legal organization of Cuban society must 
be directed toward a renewed appreciation for the rule of law, democracy, and republican 
values. We believe that that this is the only route to realizing a socialist economic, social, 
ethical, and political alternative. 
Without a constitutionalism that uses and is enriched by the most advanced tools 
for protecting, defending, and guaranteeing human rights, in Latin America and throughout 
the world, we cannot begin to build a society that is more free, participatory, involved, and 
truly sovereign.   
